SMILLER Department of State

.0. 11652. Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) OSC letter BY JK.

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ACTION: s/s

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ion.

USUN NEW YORK

PRIORITY

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EYES ONLY FOR STEVENSON AND HOCKOY

EVES GALT

As indicated in Deptel 1194, we want to be able to see and count for missiles ourselves departing/graphy and associated equipment and timix there is in procedures promise/becomeshing suggested by Kuznetsov provided it is clear that alone reliable observation, not Soviet photography above, is essential.

In this connection, following is guidance as followup mextendaria suggestions by Kuznetssv. indicating kind of inspection procedure we believe would be nacessary to check outgoing carross. Procedures worked out by interagency panel. We would strongly prefer QTE on board UNQTE procedure but prepared to accept QTE along side UNQTE procedure if necessary provided equipment is on top of deck. In discussing these procedures with Kuznetsov Ul ground of - acl you should make clear our continued insistence on/En inspection in Cuba hiding or to guard against/new@antrockattlouxoknollensivancespozza reintroduction of offensive weapons.

Problem

EAE2 BUTA

11/5/62

Telegraphic transpurses and

Cant 2: ParaltIO:INP:LISisco

classification approved by:

Harlan Cleveland

G - IIr. Johnson (draft)

Defense lir. litze (subs)

S/S - Mr. Grant

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Classification

- l. Problem. Recommend a procedure which will provide adequate verification that the USSR has in fact removed offensive equipment from Guba.
 - 2. Background.

3. Frame of Reference

mitments undertaken in paragraphs c, d, and f above.

b. In addition, it is expected that the USSR will have

complied . RANGERAR

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
complied with the position of the U.S. Government that IL28s are also to be removed from Cuba as offensive equipment.

c. The commitment to remove missiles is considered to include such as appear on the list at the end of this message. the removal of/associated items/scritzsulanunbiagupudsgatoscheduputusk moreorforatuseopeatingunissilectusespartsusayatusksgariasilectuseopeatingunissilectus and an appear of the constitution of the constitutio

- d. Photos of weapon crates or empty missile sites can be falsified as to time or location and therefore, although of value, are not foolproof.
- e. The U.S. Government knak needs to determine how Soviets propose to demonstrate no nuclear warheads or bombs remain in Cuba.
- f. The question of fighter-bombers, KOMAR motor torpedom boats and missile fuel has not been enswered.

4. Required Verification in Cuban Ports

- a. Inspection of equipment prior to loading is much to be preferred over inspection after's loading on board ship.
- b. Although from the standpoint of verification it is preferable that inspection of all components should take place prior to
 crating, nevertheless, reasonable assurance of removal (which gives
 consideration to the concern of the UCSR re espionage) can be achieved
 without inspection before crating.



c. Sufficient a uncrating should be accomplished to permit inspection to the end that reasonable verification of the contents may be ascertained. This should include physical access and whim photography.

5. Required Verification et Sec

a. Loading of Soviet ships will be carried out in such fashion that visual inspection of each crate is feasible. As an alternative, there could be partial unloading at another designated port to allow visual impa inspection. In either event a loading plan for each outgoing vessel will be provided to facilitate inspection. This is to be a detailed plan giving location and identify of offensive weapons components.

b. Soviet ships will be instructed to rendezvous with U.S. inspection vessels and to have completed appropriate uncrating in advance of rendezvous. In the event weather makes such uncrating infeasible, a delay in time or change of rendezvous will be signalled by the inspecting ship.

c. Inspection on Board

- 1. This form of inspection is much to be preferred over inspection from along side and should be requested.
- 2. If the USSE has located any of its offensive equipment below deck, on board access to these ships will be mandatory in order to obtain adequate verification.

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
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(3) Inspection will require sufficient uncrating to permit inspection to the end that reasonable verification of the contents may be ascertained. This should include physical access and photography. (There must also be sufficient uncreating-of IL 28's to reveal what components, by type and number, are contained therein.) **EXEMPTIMENTALLY STREET OF THE STREET OF T

d. Inspection from Along Side

- (1) It will not be possible to eliminate all possibility of spoofing without physical inspection on board. However, reasonable assurance can be obtained by alongside inspection, when coupled with other indications; to permit the USG to accept the mode as a fall back position.
- (2) If the US is limited to inspection from along side a vessel, all items of offensive equipment must be located on or above main deck.
- (3) Inspection will require sufficient uncrating to permit photographs and visual viewing, in order to identify from among the components listed on the attached inventory, the specific component involved. (There must also be sufficient uncrating of IL 28's to reveal what components, by type and number, are contained therein).
- (h) Hovering halicopters above the inspected vessel must be authorized in order to permit more comprehensive visual and photographic coverage.
- 6. Expertise. Each inspecting US Navy ship and boarding party will contain experts able to identify components of offensive equipment.





A LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT SPECIAL HISSIE EQUIPMENT

TO BE USED IN MAXING UP A CHECK-OFF LIST

- 1. Missiles and missile transporter
- 2. Tracked prime mover for transporter
- 3. Erector vehicles
- 4. Fool tank trailers
- 5. Wheeled prime movers for fuel vehicles
- 6. Oxydizer tank trailers
- 7. Tracked prime movers for oxydizer trailers
- 8. Launch stands
- 9. Power generators
- 10. Electronics vans
- 11. Theodolites on Pedistals

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Note: Passed to Principle Officers Executive Committee

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